Gerald Patton lecture, "World War I: The Issue of the Establishment of a Black Officers' Camp," at the University of Iowa, June 20, 1975

Speaker 1: The following is a presentation from the seventh annual Institute of Afro-American Culture, held at the University of Iowa, June the 15th to the 27th, 1975. World War I: The issue of the establishment of a black officers' camp is the subject of this lecture by Gerald Patton, an instructor in the department of Afro-American studies at the University of Iowa. Making the introduction is Dr. Darwin Turner, chairman of the department of Afro-American studies at the University of Iowa. Dr. Darwin Turn...: Our second lecturer, like Professor Woodard, is in his second term with the Institute. As I think I explained to many of you, while you are relaxing in the Institute, a course is being conducted simultaneously on this campus for the students of the University, a course which is always on the same topic as that of the Institute. The instructor of that course for the past two summers has been Gerald Patton, who was born in Chattanooga, Tennessee. He received his bachelor's from Kentucky State University, his master's from Western Illinois University, and is currently a doctoral candidate in history at this University. Dr. Darwin Turn...: From undergraduate days to the present, Gerald Patton has been winning awards. A scholarship award while an undergraduate for his graduate program at Western Illinois. He received an alumni award, research grant, for work on his master's thesis. Currently he has a Graduate Educational Opportunity's Fellowship. He's taught in the Chattanooga public high school system, where he taught history and social studies for two years. Simultaneously, he was serving as an instructor in an upward bound project at the University of Tennessee. Last year, he presented a paper on slave narratives, first at the University of Wisconsin at La Crosse conference on minorities. Then he subsequently presented a paper at this Institute. I'm very pleased to be able to introduce Gerald Patton to talk about the establishment of a black officers' camp. Gerald Patton: Thank you, Professor Turner. The complete topic that I will be discussing today is World War I and the issue of the establishment of a black officers' training camp. I think it rather fitting and appropriate that I open this paper with a quote taken from the Atlanta Exposition speech of 1895. "The laws of changeless justice bind oppressor with oppressed and close as sin and suffering joined, we march to fate abreast." In 1917, as America's entry into World War I seemed inevitable, there developed in the legislative as well as the executive branches of government, a pro and con discussion as to what would be the role of black Americans, especially black soldiers and officers in the war effort. Gerald Patton: In a sense, this became a microcosm of a larger problem that had long been troubling American society. After Reconstruction, conditions in the South where most blacks lived worsened and with discrimination and violence proliferating, masses of blacks migrated from the South to such industrial centers as Chicago, New York, Cleveland, and Detroit. Yet the North had not turned out to be the promised land of opportunity and equality. Life for blacks had remained one of discrimination and segregation, bordering on apartheid in some areas. Sporadic efforts to gain civil and political rights had failed to generate a significant unified black activism and segregation of the races continued to be accepted by virtually every institution in American life, including the federal government. Gerald Patton: Blacks, though, had responded to this atmosphere of xenophobia, nativism, and racial hostilities by developing two conflicting strategies. One was put forth by Booker T. Washington in his famous speech before the Atlanta Cotton States and International Exposition in 1895. In it he declared, "In all things that are purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress." And for enunciating this approach, Washington was immediately proclaimed by much of the white press and leadership, including President Grover Cleveland, to be the spokesman for the black race. Gerald Patton: The other position came from W.E.B. Du Bois, one of Washington's most ardent critics. In his The Souls of Black Folk, 1903, Du Bois asserted that all men were created equal and therefore should have full rights of citizenship and opportunity for education according to ability, not education that was restricted to manual or trade schools as Washington had implied. The Washington and Du Bois positions were not rhetoric or intellectual discourse. The destiny of millions of blacks was at stake and when the time came to consider the black man's role in the war, particularly the debate over black officers, these two general strategies for racial progress were to shape the course of the debate within the black community. Gerald Patton: They remain the great alternatives notwithstanding the fact that Booker T. Washington had died in 1915. It is within this context, then, that the present paper will discuss and analyze the issue of establishing a black officers' training camp. The discussion and analysis should provide insight not only into the thinking and strategy of black Americans concerned with the issue, but into the broader ramifications of race relations during the war years. Around the issue there developed unprecedented efforts in petitioning the federal government by and for blacks and how the Congress, the president, and the secretary of war handled the situation is a major focus of this paper. The discussion should also provide insight, an insight into accommodationism by integrationists and into the beginnings of a new wave of black activism as well as an understanding of the decision making process in this particular issue. Gerald Patton: Months before Woodrow Wilson signed the resolution formally declaring war on Germany, April 6th, 1917, representatives of various segments of the black community had begun to petition Congress to consider the training of black men for soldiers and possibly as officers. Early in 1917, for example, a group had been allowed to testify before the Senate subcommittee on universal military training, chaired by Senator George E. Chamberlain, a Democrat from Oregon, who was also chairman of the committee on military affairs. Consisting largely of professional men who lived in the Washington, DC, area, the group was headed by Giles B. Jackson, an attorney from Richmond, Virginia. Its major concern was that black be included in the war preparations and in its testimony, it emphasized the absolute necessity of establishing a Negro military training school commensurate with West Point in Annapolis. Gerald Patton: Behind the appearance was a concern of the black community, beginning in late 1915, for the reopening of West Point to black students. In an editorial entitled A Square Deal, published on December 4, 1915, in the Washington Bee, a black newsweekly that combined a persistent race consciousness with unfaltering support for Republicans, had taken up the West Point issue. In view of current military needs, it had argued, "Congress should open West Point to all youths eligible to compete. Negro boys in college were qualified and could make good. They ask only for equal opportunity and were looking for their friends, in quotes, 'in Congress' to see that the spirit of fair play should be the guiding star in this patriotic movement." Gerald Patton: Integration at West Point, however, had not come and in 1917, the Jackson group had decided to concentrate on making a case for a separate Negro officers' school. It wanted especially to convince congressional leaders that the project would be beneficial to all concerned and to this end, it stressed three arguments. One concerning the fighting qualities of blacks, a second concerning the training to be given black draftees, and a third concerning the compatibility of the proposal with existing arrangements. Leading off the testimony, Finley Wilson, editor of the Washington Eagle, concentrated on removing any qualms about the loyalty and military qualities of blacks. "The loyalty, valor, and fidelity of the colored men," he declared, "were proven in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, the Spanish-American War, and the latest troubles with Mexico." It's interesting to note here that no mention was made of the valor of the black soldier in the Civil War, because members of the group did not want to offend southern committee members. Gerald Patton: Speaking to the second point, James H. Hayes, another Richmond lawyer, argued that black soldiers could best be trained by black officers. And in regard to the third point, Jackson stated, "We are not drawing the color line. It has already been drawn long ago." Neither West Point nor Annapolis accepted black applicants and the young men undergoing military training in the southern black colleges were merely imitating becoming soldiers because they could not use real guns and bullets. According to the testimony, wealthy white friends, in quotes, in Richmond, were also ready to donate land for the project, provided the federal government took care of all other expenses. Gerald Patton: Apparently the Committee on Military Affairs decided to support the proposal, at least to the extent of securing a measure for investigatory and implementing commission. The subcommittee's record for January 9, 1917, stated the same day that the Jackson group testified, included the following, "January 9, 1917, an active secure site and design for a school to train Negro soldiers been enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assemble that Thomas Taggart, white, and the racial distinctions I have placed in brackets, John E. Milholland, white, W.J. Parish, white, W.S. Forbes, white, Giles B. Jackson, black, J Finley Wilson, black, and James H. Hayes, black are hereby created a commission to be known as the Negro Military School Commission to procure and to determine upon a location, plan, and design for a school for the training of Negro soldiers subject to the approval of the war department." You will notice that all of the black members of the committee, who were of course last. Gerald Patton: And on February 14 of that same year, the bill to enact this commission was forwarded to President Wilson via his personal secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty. The bill to establish this commission was never acted upon by the Congress. Subsequently, no record of any report of the commission appears in either the congressional record, the presidential papers, or the adjutant general's report. By now, anyway, the focus of the black community shifted to an immediate short run proposal, the idea of establishing a temporary black officers' training camp as opposed to a long run facility advocated by the Jackson group. It was the former that was soon receiving most of the publicity and several members of the Jackson group, including Jackson himself, quickly became involved in this new campaign. Gerald Patton: The early 1917 proposal, however, does indicate that even before Joel Spingarn and others would offer proposals regarding the training of black officers, some blacks had already set the wheels in motion and had been relatively well-received by the appropriate authorities. The acceptance of the concept of racial separatism by the Senate Committee on Military Affairs was the harbinger for what would happen later concerning other issues regarding the role of blacks in the armed forces. Meanwhile, as Finley Wilson of the Jackson Committee was proclaiming that he was representing 10 million Negros, thousands would have deemed him to be misrepresenting their views had they been aware that he was appearing before a Senate committee advocating, among other things, loyalty and patriotism to the United States. Gerald Patton: In many Negro communities there was little enthusiasm about getting involved in the war effort. The general sentiment being that, "The Germans ain't done nothing to me and if they have, I forgive them." The disposition at first was often apathetic or indifferent, although among some literate blacks there was some sympathy for France, the country that was regarded at this time as being the most liberal of all white nations in its treatment of darker peoples. In addition, much of the black press in the larger cities, a medium vital to shaping opinion among literate and influential leaders who offered themselves as representatives of the black people, "Was opposed to American intervention or to the participation of black soldiers if war came." This can be seen especially in the editorials of such leading black newspapers as The Washington Bee, the Iowa Bystander, and the Chicago Defender. Gerald Patton: In March of 1916, for example, when Colonel H.A. Rutger suggested that it might be necessary to utilize colored soldiers if America intervened in the war, the editor of the Bee was unimpressed and questioned the propriety of the participation of black men in the armed forces. The Bee informs Rutger that if war comes the colored man is not wanted and it would be a white man's war between Germany and the United States. Every colored militia in the South has been disarmed and even in the schools the students are permitted to practice with wooden guns. The Bee asks Rutger if the colored man would be justified in offering his services to a government which discriminates against him. No matter in which direction the war goes, the Negro will be benefited. Gerald Patton: Similarly, in the early months of 1917, the Bystander questioned the sincerity of the United States' participation. "We have no business to meddle in the affairs of Europe. Why need we go 3,000 miles to uphold the dignity and honor of our country and protect her citizens over in England and fail to uphold our dignity at home and Mexico and fail to protect the Negro citizens of our own states. Oh, hypocrite, thou art a jewel. The president is doing or saying nothing to stop lynching at home. We think that if a real expression from 10 million Negros were made, they would vote against such a war on Germany." Even as war was declared moreover, the Bystander seemed convinced that the Wilson administration's attitude and the objections of such powerful Democratic Senators as James Vardaman of Mississippi would keep blacks out of the military even if they were willing to participate. Gerald Patton: In its April 16, 1917 edition it reported that, "The war department does not want Negro soldiers. The present administration is against the progress of the Negro, having refused him admission to the navy and army schools or even to enlist and segregated and discriminated against him and as yet has offered no inducement to come and fight for the American flag. Why need we go now? And yet we have a few who hope to be leaders who are trying to persuade the Negro to go and they would not go themselves unless they hope to gain some office or notoriety." Such objections and reservations, however, did not keep the few, in quotes, to which the Bystander referred, "From making new proposals and launching new campaigns." Gerald Patton: By this time, another movement headquartered in Washington, DC, was already gaining support and momentum and eventually this movement, largely black, would change the whole course of events and be accepted by most of the black press and other critics of the war. In the end, they would join in a supported effort to promote a spirit of patriotism in the black community. At the core of the movement was an organization known as the Central Committee of Negro College Men, a group that urged a segregated officers' training camp, yet, for the most part, was made up of integrationists rather than separatists or black nationalists. Gerald Patton: Even Du Bois acquiesced in this position and accepted the concept of a segregated camp. Then the question naturally arises as to their motives. Did they suddenly become patriotic because of a love of America and its ideals and accept a segregated officers' training camp because it was better than no training camp? Or were there deeper reasons for accepting the camp and joining wholeheartedly in the war effort? Gerald Patton: The first part of the question can be dispensed with easily. All indications are that blacks involved were not suddenly swept by patriotism and love of country. What they were concerned about once it became clear that blacks would be drafted was the fate of the draftees. "The black community," they argued, "must give its boys all the support that could be adduced." And eventually, as will be shown later, the black press would accept this point of view, and become a major catalyst in mobilizing the black community behind a scheme that would help to give black soldiers this support. Gerald Patton: The second part of the question is more perplexing and difficult to answer but it seems likely that the blacks involved accepted the idea of a segregated camp as being the best available instrument for advancing the black cause. It had already become apparent that under no circumstances was the federal government going to allow the integration of white officers' camps and with this ruled out, a separate black establishment appeared as the best opportunity to prove to the world that given half a chance, blacks could not only become able soldiers, but effective and efficient leaders and officers. Participation moreover in a war to make the world safe for democracy would give the participants a strong weapon with which to advance the causes of civil rights and racial democracy in their homeland, a weapon that activists were already beginning to deploy as a debate over participation continued. Gerald Patton: Some may have been even thinking in terms of the positive correlation between wars and the status of blacks that was later propounded by the Howard University professor Kelly Miller. Writing in 1919, Miller argued, "In America the conception of the Negro has ever fluctuated in direct ratio to the rise and fall of military domination. Whenever the military agencies of the government have been exalted, the Negro has been benefited by reaction of the public mind." This view was also supported in several articles, in particular, by Du Bois in The Crisis. In any event, the leaders of the movement early began to stress what the training camp could do for the cause of racial justice. Gerald Patton: Speaking to the students at Howard University in March 1917, Joel Spingarn began by emphasizing the proposal was in no way connected with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. It was, he said, his suggestion alone, but acceptance of it would not exclude continuous agitation for equal justice. On the contrary, it would give blacks a greater opportunity to agitate more effectively and efficiently, and as a realist, he felt that this was the only way black officers would be trained. Despite the early efforts of groups and individuals like the Giles Jackson committee, the war department seemed unlikely to accept anything more. Gerald Patton: One indicator of the attitudes of Spingarn and his group would have to overcome came in the March 24th editorial of the Bee, arguing that the proposal was a step backward. The newspaper declared that, "It is perfectly natural that any plan, system, or practice which is based on social distinction should be opposed. Colored people should never accept any segregation or distinction based on race alone except where they must do so in spite of objection and protest, and then only with the understanding that they do so until they can change conditions." There can be in mind no question of Dr. Spingarn's good motive. There's no obligation to agree with him. Beyond these preliminary considerations, the Bee is not now prepared to go. Gerald Patton: The Defender was even more reluctant about accepting the concept of a segregated camp. In a lengthy editorial in the April 17th, 1917 edition, it was pointed out that the theory of half a loaf is better than no loaf is inoperative. While acknowledging Spingarn's friendliness, in quotes, "towards blacks," the article ended in a repudiation of segregation. "When a separate training camp is established for the Irish, German, Italian, Swede, and all other hyphenated Americans, then and not until then will we consider it our duty to support such an organization." In rebutting such objections, Spingarn pointed to the other groups opposing the project. "Helping colored men to become commissioned officers," he declared, "was actually the last thing the white supremacists wanted." The South with Vardaman as its chief spokesman, did not want blacks to get any kind of military training and the general staff of the army was also opposed. The camp, as Spingarn saw it, was a temporary four week expedient that might possibly alter the fate of the colored race throughout a great war. At a time of crisis, colored men must get officers' training as soon as possible and there was no other way with the whole army against them. Gerald Patton: Also aligned with Spingarn by this time were two other important individuals in the black community. One was Colonel Charles Young, a West Point officer who was now the ranking black in the military. The other was Du Bois, who at the time was editor of The Crisis: A Record of the Darker Races, a publication that was the most widely circulated of the black news magazines. Long associated with Spingarn and the NAACP, Du Bois had early lent his support and began arguing in The Crisis that since the regular training camps were wickedly close to blacks, there must be a separate training camp for Negro officers. Gerald Patton: Meanwhile, as Spingarn's movement gained momentum, the nation had moved into war, abolished such civilian camps as Plattsburgh, and proceeded to establish 14 officers' training camps as authorized by Section 54 of the National Defense Act. No provisions, however, were made for the training of black officers and blacks were not admitted to the 14 white camps. The reaction of those advocating the Spingarn proposal was quick and vigorous. With faculty members and students at Howard University taking the lead, an all-out campaign was put into operation for the purpose of petitioning Congress, the war department, and the president. Once in operation, the campaign readily won the support of a growing number of blacks and newspapers and other key leaders. Gerald Patton: A key meeting came on May 1st, 1917, when the president and deans at Howard University allowed students to convene a student assembly, raise funds, and dispatch representatives to other black colleges. Out of this meeting came the Central Committee of Negro College Men, CCNCM, and many other members of the earliest Spingarn committee now joined this organization. Headquartered in the basement of Howard University Chapel, the CCNCM now set out to acquire the names of as many black men as possible who might qualify as officers candidates. Consequently, its campaign focused chiefly on college campuses, especially those of such black schools as Lincoln University, Fisk University, Atlanta University, Morehouse College, Tuskegee Institute, Hampton Institute, Virginia Union Seminary, and Morgan College. Within 10 days, the CCNCM had obtained some 1,500 names to be presented to the war department. Gerald Patton: Next efforts by the CCNCM were shifted to petitioning and lobbying in Congress. There, it contacted congressmen who had shown some interest in the cause, men, for example, like Murray Hulbert, a Democrat from New York City, and George H. Tinkham, a Massachusetts Republican. It also presented over 300 congressmen with a letter detailing the grounds for requesting the training of black officers. In part the letter read, "Our country faces the greatest crisis in its history. The Negro, as ever loyal and patriotic, is anxious to do his full share in the defense and support of the country in its fight for democracy. The Negro welcomes the opportunity of contributing his full quota to the federal army now being organized. He feels very strongly that these Negro troops should be officered by their own men." Gerald Patton: Murray Hulbert in particular was supportive of the proposal. As early as September 6th, 1916, he had spoken out against an attempt to prevent blacks from enlisting or reenlisting in the military. At that time, he had recounted the valorous service rendered by blacks in the previous wars and had quoted from Secretary of War Newton Baker to show the administration was in agreement. Bills seeking to prevent the enlistment or reenlistment of people of the colored race in the military service, Baker had assured him, would receive the adverse recommendation of the war department. He went on to say that black soldiers participating in the recent Mexican expedition had conducted themselves with the greatest intrepidity and reflected nothing but honor upon the uniform which they wore. Gerald Patton: On May 8th, shortly after being contacted by the CCNCM and perhaps being reminded that his district contained many blacks, Hulbert wrote to Baker regarding the establishment of a training camp for black officers. "Representing a constituency of nearly one-third of whose population are members of the Negro race, to whom the right of franchise is not denied, may I inquire, one, whether the Negro is expected to furnish his proportionate quota in the army, two, whether recognition will be given to the principle that competent and intellectual Negros should have the opportunity to lead troops of their own race. 1,000 Negro college students and graduates have already placed themselves to enter such a training camp immediately. I submit that the records of the Negro officers and troops warrant the provision for Negro officers to lead Negro troops and beg to inquire whether some provisions cannot be made for the reception of one of the 14 camps already provided for, or if that be impracticable, if you will not by order establish an additional camp for colored citizens who desire to obtain commission in the Officers' Reserve Corps." Gerald Patton: A week later on May 15, Hulbert received a letter from H.P. McCain, the adjutant general, informing him that the question of organization of training camps for Negro candidates and for Officers' Reserve Corps is under consideration and more information will be made available after a decision is finalized. In the meantime, the CCNCM campaign and lobbying efforts were making themselves felt. Other groups were also focusing on the broad question of wartime loyalty and minority rights. One such group was the National Equal Rights League. In a memorial to Congress, which was subsequently read into the record, the group took pains to declare, "The loyalty of black Americans who are at the same time enumerating the injustices and acts of discrimination under which blacks still labored, they envision the war as a means for improving civil rights and race relations when the officers and soldiers returned." Gerald Patton: "As the nation goes forth to fight the [inaudible] of liberty," it was stated, "Let Americans resolve that all shall have liberty within her borders. As she fights for democracy against autocracy, let there be democracy at home 100%, not 90% strong. And once the war was over, the goals fought for abroad must not be denied blacks at home." In the Washington area, the Bee also echoed the idea that just because there was a war being fought, the agitation for race progress must not be allowed to desist. "The colored man is asked to be loyal," it noted, "and he was loyal. But he could not help denouncing the continual outrages that were being perpetuated upon him in southern states." Gerald Patton: The black press also changed its policy of black nonparticipation to loyalty and support for the war efforts, as well as the acceptance of a training camp exclusive for blacks. The Bee, in a March 31st, 1917, editorial, pronounced, "Rally to the flag." The main theme of this article was, "Let us forgive, even if we cannot forget." Subsequent articles in May, 1917, were also supportive of the new war effort. The Bystander, likewise, in June 15th, 1917, in an editorial, declared, "To the Negro race, this camp means a marvelous development and advancement and challenge to our educated Negros to be officered in military tactics." There were other instances that can be cited of the black press by and large joining in a concerted effort to support the war effort and the patriotic atmosphere. Gerald Patton: In fact, Du Bois, in an editorial later on in The Crisis in 1918, wrote an article that became very controversial called Close Ranks and he was later attacked for this position by Byron Gunner, who was president of the National Equal Rights League, the same organization William Monroe Trotter was the secretary. So by and large then, after the camp was seen as the only alternative, the black press joined in an effort to support such a camp. With such concerns continuing, the battle for a black officers' training camp was now shifting to Congress, from Congress rather, to the war department. Gerald Patton: Emmett Jay Scott later remembered that over 300 senators and representatives approved of the CCNCM petition but if action was to come speedily, the best approach seemed to be through the implementation of existing legislation rather than changes in the law. Therefore, the interested parties now focused their attention on President Wilson and the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker. On May 11th, J. Milton Waldron who was a prominent black minister in Washington, DC, and had been past president of the local chapter of the NAACP there, representing the committee of 100 citizens of the war, wrote to Wilson urging him to set up a camp for blacks. By this time, Secretary Baker was also arranging meetings between his staff and representatives from the black community. As the Waldron letter makes clear, the power to establish military camps had been exclusively given to Baker and it was to securing action by Baker that Waldron directed most of his argument. Gerald Patton: To the war department he wrote, said that it was "inadvisable to admit colored men to the 14 regular training camps," and suggested a separate camp. Our young men are so anxious to serve the country in this crisis they are willing to accept a separate camp. 1,500 qualified men have already made application for admission to such a camp and their applications are already filed with the secretary of war. Howard University, a government institution, offers the use of its buildings and grounds for the camp in case other situations are not available. This opportunity for our representative young men to receive training is not only necessary for the proper efficiency of the army, but it is also essential to the active and hardy patriotism of 10 million colored citizens. Gerald Patton: On May 21, Waldron received a reply from Joseph Tumulty informing him that Secretary Baker had authorized the establishment of a black officers' training camp at Fort Des Moines, Iowa. During the week on May 12th, two important meetings on the feasibility of such a camp had been held between black leaders in Washington, the faculty and the administration of Howard University, and representatives of the war department. Among those in attendance were President Stephen M. Newman of Howard, Dean Kelly Miller of Howard, and Dr. George Cabanas, a prominent black physician in Washington, DC. Presiding over the first meeting was Major John J. Kingman of the war college. Over the second, Secretary Baker himself. Out of the meetings had come the decision to establish the camp. Gerald Patton: On May 17, when the president saw Baker's aid on how to respond to the various groups asking for a black officers' camp, the White House learned of what had been decided. Baker's letter to Wilson also gives some insight into how he reached the decision. "I was called upon many times by Mr. Waldron and representatives of his committee of 100. After considering their request, I came to the conclusion that a training camp for colored people ought to be established. It has now been definitely fixed at Fort Des Moines, Iowa, with full concurrence of the authorities at Howard University. So far as I know, the question is settled wisely from the point of view of the army and certainly from the point of view of the colored men." Gerald Patton: Although Newman and others had been informed of the decision to open the training camp at Fort Des Moines, the official announcement was not made until May 23rd. It came in a letter from H.P. McCain, the adjutant general of the army to the chief of staff of departments. This made it official and the CCNCM declared the result to be a victory. To the men involved it was our due recognition at last. They disregarded the critics that said the camp was Jim Crow because they had been given the assurance that black candidates would be given the same recognition, treatment, instruction, and pay as the white candidates. They had also stressed the challenge of responsibility. "The race is on trial. If we fail, our enemies will dub us cowards for all times and we can never win our rightful place. But if we succeed, then eternal success, a mighty far-reaching step forward. 1,250 colored army officers leading Negro troops. Look to the future, brothers. The vision is glorious." Gerald Patton: The news that black men would be trained as officers at Fort Des Moines spread rapidly throughout the country and was warmly received in most sectors of the black community. The point that this was a splendid opportunity for black men to be leaders in a great, if not potentially dangerous, event was often heard. Creeping into the conversations, news articles, and books of the period was a recurring theme that the race would be advanced as a result of the war, and the black soldier and officer would play a large role in this process. John Lay Thompson, editor of the Iowa Bystander during the war period, wrote and published a book in 1917 dealing with some of his personal experiences at Fort Des Moines. Gerald Patton: In the forward to the volume, George H. Woodson, a black attorney in Des Moines, detailed what he hoped would be the outcome of the war as far as blacks were concerned. His remarks revealed a mixture of desperation and hope that must have been characteristic of others. "God grant that their sacrifices may open a brighter and better day for all the downtrodden people of the Earth and especially the oppressed colored people in these United States so as to prevent racial discrimination in public places of accommodation, the denial of the ballot, and the suppression of the vote, the limiting of industrial and civil privileges to menial occupation, the segregation in the cities, schools, and government departments and public places, the elimination of mob violence and things of the darker past, and give to the country and the world the true principle of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States as amended." Gerald Patton: While numerous accolades of praise for the new camp at Fort Des Moines were still being heard throughout the country, a baffling event jolted the euphoric-like atmosphere and brought many people back to the reality of the omnipresent race problem. The event concerned Colonel Charles Young, the third black to graduate from West Point and at the time, the highest ranking black officer. Young, who was 49 years of age in 1917, had served in the American West, in Haiti, Liberia, and in Mexico. He was cited by General Pershing for having done a particularly good job in Mexico. Revered as being a hard but fair commanding officer, he now had expectations of being in charge of Fort Des Moines. To the amazement, and he had the credentials for this, to the amazement and the consternation of many blacks, however, Colonel Young was bypassed for the position and was retired from the regular army. During a physical examination it was discovered or at least alleged that he had high blood pressure and this became the official reason for the retirement. Gerald Patton: Colonel Young desperately wanted to be with the black officers' candidates at Fort Des Moines but he was powerless to get the decision reversed. In a letter to old colleague and confidant Du Bois, they had taught together at Wilberforce, he candidly reacted to his retirement. "No one in the regiment, either officer or man, believe me sick and no one say the doctors here at the hospital, not even the nurses. Without ache or pain here I sit twirling my thumbs when the officers are overworked and when I should at this minute be at Des Moines helping to bend those colored officers into shape and later to get my whole heart into the work of organization of the drafted Negro troops. If someone could let the president and secretary of war know the bad mental and moral effect this seemingly enforced retirement will have upon our people rather than permit me to be shelved, they would sacrifice me body and soul for the country's good." Gerald Patton: Using the widely read Crisis, Du Bois raised questions about the forced retirement of Colonel Young. Although retired from the regular army, Young was still on active duty with the adjutant general of the state of Ohio, organizing a colored regiment of dismantled cavalry that was never used during the war. And as Du Bois saw it, the whole arrangement was motivated by things other than Young's health. "The law," Du Bois stated, "says an officer retired from active duty with the regular army and put on duty during the period of the war, will not receive a higher grade or promotion than he had when appointed. Therefore, Young could not be promoted to the rank of brigadier-general and this would eliminate the possibility of his commanding white officers and soldiers." Gerald Patton: Later with the war almost over, Colonel Young would make a dramatic last ditch effort to come out of retirement. In June of 1918, he rode 500 miles by horseback from Xenia, Ohio to Washington, DC, to prove that he was physically fit to be in the active service. Secretary Baker was impressed with the arduous feat but it proved futile. Young would never see active duty in France and he was never allowed to go to Fort Des Moines in an official capacity. He appeared there only as a special guest in route from San Francisco to Ohio. Still, the CCNCM had succeeded in getting the training camp approved and it put together 1,000 potential candidates who, in the estimation of the organization, were qualified to be leaders of soldiers. Colonel Young would not be their commanding officer, but now the rule of thumb was to accept what you can get when you can get it and make the best out of it. Gerald Patton: It was on to Fort Des Moines. The atmosphere was charged. There was a certain headiness among the officers candidate. From the Jackson committee to the Spingarn proposal to the Central Committee of Negro College Men, there had been a concerted effort to find a role for blacks in World War I. The main focus had been on the establishment of an officers' training camp and out of this successful campaign, there emerged a new black activism. No longer would blacks passively accept injustice and discrimination. They would continue to petition for civil rights and equality of opportunity in all sectors of American life. And once underway, this activism would continue to draw strength from the wartime migration of southern blacks to the northern industrial areas. Myriad jobs had been made available in the factories and plants due to expanding industrialization and, later, due to the conscription of white males for the armed services. Gerald Patton: The fact that the black soldiers and officers were fighting for the country gave the new migrants one more reason to demand an end to Jim Crow racial policies. Many of the individuals involved in the war effort to get black officers' training camp established were integrationists, but early it became clear that there would be no camp for blacks unless it was a segregated one headed by white commanding officers. The strategy of Booker T. Washington and his supporters, that is, accommodationism or the acceptance of segregation for blacks, proved to be the victorious strategy concerning this issue. Gerald Patton: Most integrationists had acquiesced and accepted this proposal as being better than nothing. They felt that in the long run acceptance of this camp would be beneficial to the race. From the black perspective, the soldier was not laying down his life just to make the world safe for democracy, but to make the United States acknowledge the black man and enforce the principles of equality of opportunity at home. This was his greater task. The black officer would also hopefully be able to demonstrate that he could be a responsible leader in the area of armament. Once it became evident that the black men have the opportunity to become soldiers and officers, the black press also changed its policy of unconcern regarding American participation in the war and joined in a campaign to promote patriotism in the black community. Gerald Patton: Sometimes this bordered on retreat from any agitation for reform, but more generally, reform and military participation were never seen as complementary. An equal share in the burden of fighting became a reason and justification for demanding equal opportunity at home. The decision to open Fort Des Moines to black officers was made by Newton Baker. President Wilson on the issue was apathetic and failed to show much real concern. He delegated the responsibility to Baker and was informed after the decision was announced to leaders of the CCNCM. Baker had a reputation of being fair to blacks. Perhaps the fact that he was once the mayor of Cleveland, a city with a proportionately high black population, may have influenced him. Gerald Patton: The unity blacks were able to develop in petitioning the Congress and the war department, especially among influential leaders such as Du Bois and the presidents of the various black colleges, along with the support of men like Joel Spingarn, no doubt weighed heavily on the final decision. Also of importance was the relative absence of white opposition to a segregated camp headed by white officers. Except for a few vociferous men like Senator Vardaman of Mississippi, there was little objection. The CCNCM and others were never able to win enough support in Congress to bring forth any legislation regarding the training of black officers. Several memorials requesting the establishment of black officers' training camp were read into the record but there was no debate. Gerald Patton: However, the CCNCM was able to persuade some congressmen to request of Baker that the camp be established. Such was the case of Murray Hulbert, congressman of New York City. These collective forces along with the simple fact that there was a need to garner all available manpower and leadership with as much expedience as possible were factors in the decision to provide training facilities for black officers. Fort Des Moines was only the beginning for black officers. The history of their successes and failures as a group, not only in the army, but in the social and political context of the war years and the interim period between the two great wars, is yet to be written.