Stopping conflict diamonds: can the Kimberley Process succeed?, Iowa City, Iowa, January 23, 2006

- [David Schoenbaum] As my friend Larry Korb once said when asked to brief Ronald Reagan in five minutes, I'll be brief, I'll be brilliant, and I'll be out of here. Our speaker is a native of South Dakota and proud of it. He's a graduate of that other UI known as the University of Illinois. He confessed to me this morning that this is the first time he's ever been in Iowa at least at ground level. I think we'll all agree that it's about time. In his 30 years in public service, eventful years in public service, he helped liquidate the Cold War, he resolved the last of the outstanding Holocaust claims after half a century. He did his bit to impose limits on the ghastly trade in African diamonds that so often proved to be African insurgent thug's best friend. By popular demand, he'll talk to us today about diamonds. I note again that this program is sponsored by Mike Margolin and Hands Jewelers since 1854. - [J.D. Bindenagel] Thank you George, and thank you David. It is certainly a pleasure to be here at Iowa City Foreign Relations Council and to talk about a very important issue that you all asked me to talk about in case you wondered why the topic was chosen. As David mentioned, being from South Dakota and really making my first visit to Iowa, it's not the first time I've been in Iowa, but first visit to Iowa, it is indeed about time. It is clear to me that foreign policy is not far from your experience, and I'd launch immediately into the idea that all politics is local. Foreign politics is local politics, and here we are being sponsored by a diamond jeweler dealer today. I'm very pleased to see that and to have your support. I'd like to start off with a question about conflict diamonds. Conflict diamonds, the name conflict diamonds came out of the conflict in Sierra Leone, Angola, and Liberia in the 1990s. They were diamonds that were used to finance the rebels that were trying to overthrow the legitimate governments and were using slave and other torture methods to have miners collect the diamonds, sell them, and use them to support their wars. Conflict diamonds became part of the public awareness throughout the 90s in debates, but really reached our consciousness through Hollywood. In 2002, a film, a James Bond film called Die Another Day, hit the market. And in that story, the evil doer was collecting and using diamonds to finance his activities from Iceland. Well, Iceland doesn't have any diamonds. The diamonds were, in this movie, funneled through a legitimate dealer, the Cubans, and indeed, made the point that diamonds, small as they are, could be used to finance conflict. So as we look at diamonds from our point of view, they're a unique source, a resource evoking beauty and eternal love. But in recent years, that beautiful picture has been overcome by pictures of maimed children and rebel groups in Africa who use their diamonds to finance their wars. People living in countries with abundant diamonds should have been receiving the benefits of their patrimony. But instead, their proceeds were going to finance arms and prolong insurrections, particularly in Sierra Leone and Angola. The facts from Sierra Leone and Angola are actually very chilling. In Angola, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA rebels exported three to four billion dollars in diamonds between 1994 and 1998. Diamond sales help to finance the civil war that cost over half a million lives, displaced three and a half million people, and forced some 300,000 refugees to flee the country. In Sierra Leone, diamonds for arms trade helped transform the Revolutionary United Front from a band of about 400 to an army of thousands that gained infamy in a magnitude of its atrocities. The civil war in Sierra Leone killed more than 50,000 people, displaced over 1/3 of the country's 4.5 million and drove some 500,000 people in neighboring countries. Reports circulated that government forces, the African-based Lebanese diamond traders, and the ECOWAS cease fire monitoring group were trading conflict diamonds. Other reports, for instance, from World Security Network reported that Africa, with its huge networks of informal economy, is an environment for terrorist groups to finance themselves. There were rumors that Al-Qaeda profited from the informal economic structures in Africa. Although there wasn't enough evidence and may not be today, many analysts think it's still plausible that Al Qaeda was involved in the diamond trade in Sierra Leone and gems trafficking in Tanzania, prolonging other conflicts. Once the world became aware of the link between diamond trade and these rebellions, the world community recognized that conflict diamonds needed to be dealt with urgently in a manner that did not harm the legitimate diamond industry upon which the economies of many African countries depend. The South African government brought together in May 2000 a unique grouping of governments, the diamond industry, and interested non-governmental organizations in Kimberley, South Africa. The Kimberley Process was born in Kimberley, South Africa by that group. Non-governmental organizations such as World Vision, Global Witness, Amnesty International, Oxfam, Catholic Relief Services, Partnership Canada Africa, and others came together in an unique effort to end the killing and conflict in Africa. The diamond industry also had the courage to take up the challenge together with these NGOs and pledged itself to changing its own business practices. Led by southern African states that had called for the initial Kimberley meeting, dozens of governments slowly, but surely, came around to join the fight to fight the conflict diamonds in Africa. Parallel to the Kimberley Process in the United Nations, the UN General Assembly pushed the Kimberley Process forward with a consensus resolution that called on the participants to devise effective and pragmatic measures to address the problem of conflict diamonds. The United Nations General Assembly enacted resolutions, which called on the international community to give urgent and careful consideration to devising effective and pragmatic measures to address this problem. As the negotiations began, it was clear that the role of the negotiating partners was really unusual. This time, the negotiations included governments, the diamond industry, and NGOs. NGOs and industry are usually outside the negotiation, but in this case, they eventually played a direct role in the negotiations themselves. Governments had to create a system of internal controls designed to eliminate conflict diamonds from import and export trade. The certificates that were created would need to be uniquely numbered and forgery proof. Each country had to have an inspection system to enforce national law. The diamond industry, in addition, needed to comply with the Kimberley Process certification scheme, including registering Kimberley Process certificates and to provide its own internal system of warranties to complement the Kimberley Process itself. However, despite the new roles for representatives of governments, diamond industry, and NGOs, they did work together over the course of seven meetings in about two years. And they developed market mechanisms to create a clean diamond cartel, banning conflict diamonds from entering the legal market. The system came to be known as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Scheme was an English word, not an American word. And it reflected a program, not a scheme in our sense. Negotiators agreed in 2002 this Kimberley Process Certification Scheme mandated participants to ensure that no shipments of rough diamonds would be imported into a non-participating state. But the Kimberley Process was not a legally binding treaty among nations. Instead, it was a set of binding minimum common standards needing national legislation for its implementation. Reaching a consensus among so many different players on a regulatory program to ban conflict diamonds from the trading system was in itself an impressive accomplishment that reflects the willingness of participants to put the goal of ending conflict diamonds trade ahead of more narrow interests. All of those that took part, with thanks to the South African process chair, Abu Chekeny, who more than once broke through stalled negotiations and kept the governments engaged in a way to move forward. But the next critical milestone in the Kimberley Process was to implement that certification scheme. Meeting in Interlochen, Switzerland in November 2002, the countries agreed to the Interlochen Declaration, which called for a simultaneous launch of the Kimberley Process on January 1, 2003 through national legislation. The United States, the largest consumer market for diamonds, the process would prove more difficult than anticipated. In the United States, my friend Walter Kansteiner, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Tony Wang, Anthony Wang, the Assistant Secretary for State for Economic Business Affairs, turned to me to bring this negotiation and legislation in the United States to force. The debate that has to do would take on three fronts, interagency coordinate among a disparate group of US government agencies, Senate and House legislation, and international cooperation among diamond dealers, governments, and NGOs. I was a rather unusual choice for this. I had spent my entire professional career in service to the United States of America with three decades in diplomacy, but I had never gone to Africa. I didn't know much about diamonds. And yet, I was compelled by the need to end the killing in Africa and accepted the opportunity. My leadership of the negotiation began with, as you can imagine, a most difficult internal US government bureaucratic battle. I called together the agencies that would be engaged in implementing this process, Treasury, Customs, the Census Bureau, State Department, US Trade representative, Department of Commerce, and others. None of them agreed to the Kimberley Process. Consensus could easily be reached on the horrible consequences of an illicit trade in diamonds, especially in Sierra Leone. However, not one of these agencies agreed to procedures for the United States to implement this negotiated Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Jurisdictional disputes, aversion to cumbersome import and export controls, opposition to trade bans from the WTO, the World Trade Organization, were among many reasons raised as obstacles to implementation. On Capitol Hill, the legislative process was stalled. Representative Tony Hall's Clean Diamond Trade Act had passed the House 400 to eight, but the NGOs that sought changes in the Senate with Senator Grassley among others to change the law, which were not part of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. And consequently by the summer of 2002, the passage of the Clean Diamond Trade Act was deemed unlikely. I also invited the NGO representatives into the State Department to consult with them on their willingness to compromise to implement this process. We gathered World Vision, Oxfam, Catholic Relief Services, Amnesty International, and others in a unique meeting, I must say, inside the State Department, where these organizations didn't normally tread. I sensed that in the meeting itself was an important recognition, though, for their role in the negotiating process and that they would be willing to compromise to get legislation. And finally, I met with the World Diamond Council in New York to explore the industry's willingness to work closely with the State Department and other US government agencies to create the Kimberley Process Certificates and to take on responsibility for winning the industry to the implementation plan. I set out to forge that implementation plan that adhered closely to the already negotiated certification scheme and to minimize the bureaucratic requirements as well as to win industry support. Through countless meetings in Johannesburg, Washington, New York, London, and Antwerp, we finally arrived in Interlochen, Switzerland in November of 2002. Through intensive negotiations, we were able to craft an implementing strategy that won the support of Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, which became the importing authority and is now Homeland Security, and the Bureau of Census, the export authority. The industry, with the support of NGOs, created a non-profit organization, the United States Kimberley Process Authority to issue licenses and certificates to companies based on a legally binding contract according to the Kimberley Process standards and stating diamonds listed on the certificates were conflict free. These certificates, validated by the US government importing and exporting authorities, became then a basis for conflict free diamond trade. Trade in rough diamonds without such certificates was banned, and that law is enforced by US Customs. Having looked at the possibility of another UN Security Council resolution banning trading conflict diamonds worldwide and finding that strategy with little winning support, I turned to a Congressional strategy. The process was problematic as the days in the fall of 2002 were moving quickly without movement of this legislation in Congress. The passions of 2001 had moved the House of Representatives to pass Tony Hall's legislation had run their course in the Senate, and they failed to act. The House Ways and Means Committee raised objections about the trade ban, which was a contravention to US obligations under the World Trade Organization. But working closely with the committee's legal council, we looked to a trade ban waiver proposed by the Canadians in the WTO to exempt the conflict ban diamonds ban from the WTO obligations. Seeking a parallel approval process, I took one further step and explored the possibility of a presidential executive order to launch the Kimberley Process in the United States if legislation could not be passed. Time was running out as we prepared for the Kimberley Process signing ceremony in Interlochen, where we all expected the participating countries to agree to simultaneously launch this certification scheme on January 1, 2003. With this strategy in hand, the US delegation went to Interlochen to join the international debate on the Kimberley Process. Meeting in Interlochen, we achieved our goal to bind every country signing the declaration to implement minimum standards by January 1. I told the press and the New York Times that we were dead serious about implementing the Kimberley Process in the United States. Of course, as my former Secretary of State George Schultz used to say, in Washington, no question is ever finally decided. My triumph on the return to Washington was short lived as House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas called US trade representative Bob Zoellick to question whether the proposed presidential executive order would circumvent Congressional action and whether it would keep the US in line with its WTO obligations. As you can imagine, my friend Bob Zoellick called me in to get an answer. Shortly afterward, a committee of deputy secretaries met at the White House, and I was asked to brief them on our progress and to seek authority to proceed. Reporting to the committee, I was pleased to say that we had a system to implement the Kimberley Process, which would contribute to the ending of diamond financing for rebels in Africa, reduce illicit trade in rough diamonds, and make it more difficult for Al Qaeda to use diamonds to finance terrorism. The committee approved of the implementation plan, but they had no desire to bypass the legislative process if Chairman Thomas could pass legislation in short order. My trump card was pulled. I needed to get the implementation plan passed in legislation quickly. It was obvious in that December that January 1 would come and go without the United States fulfilling its Interlochen pledge. But I was determined to get legislation as soon as possible and worked very intensively with the House and Senate to have them recraft the Clean Diamond Trade Act to be consistent with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. But the issue was then in the hands of the Congress. Representative Bill Thomas led a congressional delegation to Africa, which I saw as a great opportunity to get him to pledge, which he did, to work together with the administration to enact legislation quickly, adhering to our obligations, of course, under the WTO. The industry worked hard to get the first certificates ready by January 1, and I turned to my Canadian colleagues and asked Canada if they would recognize American certificates even though the United States could not legally enforce them until legislation was passed. The Canadians agreed. And the US was given a grace period to comply while waiting for legislation. The WTO introduced a trade ban waiver for conflict diamonds in February, which addressed the congressional concern. But when February passed without legislation, I thought, perhaps, a little extracurricular activity would be necessary, and I called Steve Morrison at the Center for Strategic International Studies in Washington and proposed to him two conferences, a conference in Washington at CSIS where he was and in Chicago at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations because Senator Durbin was on the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee sub-committee for Africa. He agreed, and we invited the negotiating teams from the industry, from Africa, from the NGO community, and from the governments to come to these two conferences. We, of course, also invited Representative Thomas, Senators Grassley and Durbin to these meetings. They understood the message, and in the lead up to those two conferences, sure enough, the House introduced the Clean Diamond Trade Act. And by the time of our meetings, the legislation was passed. And shortly afterward, the president, on April 25, signed the implementing legislation. It wasn't until July 29, 2003, however, when the president certified the Clean Diamond Trade Act had gone into effect that the United States became a full participant, joining 54 countries in this important effort to ban conflict diamonds. Under the US system, all rough diamonds shipped to the United States must be accompanied by a Kimberley certificate. And when rough diamonds are exported, the customs service validates the Kimberley certificates are produced in the United States by the United States Kimberley Process Authority. I was very pleased that the industry and the parties agreed to enter into this process. The industry also established its own internal voluntary system of self-regulation, which provides for a system of warranties underpinned through verification by independent auditors of individual companies and supported by internal penalties set by the industry, a double system that would help support and implement and enforce the Kimberley Process in the United States. So what has happened with our little Kimberley Process Certification Scheme? Well, it's proven to be a force for good. By 2004, some 56,791 Kimberley certificates had been issued. If one takes Sierra Leone as an example, during the civil war, conflict diamonds were used to finance rebels, none were exported legally. This past year, 2005, Sierra Leone exported nearly $200 million in rough diamonds. And that patrimony is now going to the people of Sierra Leone. The rest of the story is also similar. In 2004, rough diamond production had reached $10 billion with Botswana, the largest mining producer at $2.3 billion, followed by Russia, Canada, and South Africa. Those are from mines, and the alluvial diamonds, those that are found in rivers and near the surface, now represent something of 25% to 30% of the world's output, which comes from Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and others. The progress achieved by the Kimberley participants is clear today. Around the world, regulation of trade in rough diamonds is successful. The process, however, must be refined and made more effective if we are to make Africa a more secure place and to ensure the patrimony that belongs to the people is mined and sold for their benefit, not for illicit traders. More needs to be done. The United Nations Security Council unanimously approved a resolution last month to ban imports of rough diamonds from the war torn Cote d'Ivoire. The UN has also maintained its sanctions, diamond sanctions, against Liberia. Although as soon as the newly elected Liberian government can end illicit trade in diamonds, the UN Security Council's promised to lift sanctions. Peer reviews continue to expose participants in the international community to ensure compliance. The suspension of the Republic of Congo, Congo Brazzaville, for not meeting requirements of the Kimberley Process shows that the process does have teeth. And the Kimberley Process is addressing the need to increase compliance and effectiveness in monitoring in its review missions. 19 participants had been reviewed and six more are planned. Statistics, monitoring, and participation, and cooperation with international organizations such as the UN Security Council remain key issues. Better and transparent statistics are critical. Ensuring that all countries have technical and financial assistance necessary to fill minimum standards calls for instance of training of more customs officials. Of course, the diamond industry carries a heavy responsibility to do what it must do to stop the trade in conflict diamonds and to help governments crack down on illicit traders. Also, the plight of miners need to be addressed, and the new initiative, the Diamond Development Initiative, has begun to improve the working conditions of diamond miners. Critical in my view is the leadership of the Kimberley Process. This year, Botswana will chair the Kimberley Process and will be followed next year by the European Union, ensuring the continuity in leadership. So will the Kimberley Process end conflict and brutal killing financed by diamonds? Again, according to the World Security Network, what makes Africa so attractive and vulnerable to terrorists and international crime is its resources. And diamonds will continue to attract not only legitimate companies, but also illegal and informal entrepreneurs. As we've seen in the past, mineral resources played a key role in financing civil war and militias. Illegal diamond trade was a major source to finance the war between Angolan government and UNITA and Sierra Leone. And instability of the Democratic Republic of Congo is largely due to the attractiveness of a vast amount of mineral resources in the region. Smuggling of diamonds and other raw materials across Central Africa is a key obstacle to freedom and peace in the region. As long as illegal trade is simple, providing stability in the region will be even more difficult for democratic states. And missions to provide stability in the region are likely to fail. Consequently, it must be a priority of Africans, Europeans, and Americans alike to support measures such as the Kimberley Process, which seek to end financing of conflict in Africa. We have begun to fulfill this obligation to those that have suffered in Africa's wars by banning trade in conflict diamonds. Our goal is to eliminate conflict diamonds and to bring the proceeds from diamond trade to the benefit of the people and support economic development of their communities. In conclusion, I'd like to return to where we began. We began this discussion with the power of movies to raise consciousness. We must remember what has happened in Africa when diamonds would symbolize beauty and love become the financiers of brutal war. Now, conflict diamonds will be the subject of another film. This film is a thriller entitled the Blood Diamond. It's an African adventure set in Sierra Leone in about 1999 when the region was in the midst of its civil war. The film stars Leonardo DiCaprio, who will apparently play a juggler specialized in blood diamonds used to finance rebellions and terrorists. That's where we began. Much progress and peace has resulted from this historic agreement, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Much remains to be done. Thank you. - [David Schoenbaum] Well, first, a remark if you'll indulge me for a moment. I think you'll all agree that Ambassador Bindenagel's experience in Washington and Africa has prepared him spectacularly for his current job, which is negotiating with the mayor of Chicago and the Chicago City Council. Perhaps, you might indulge me in a brief question of my own, which just baffles me as a lifelong student of bureaucracy. What exactly does the Bureau of Census have to do with all this? - [J.D. Bindenagel] One of the key issues in the Kimberley Process, thank you David, is that very point. One of the obstacles was how do you validate a certificate. Do we, as a US government, take on a bureaucracy that would create certificates, create requirements, and then have staff to approve this? Or could we do something more novel? What we did was we asked the industry if they would use bank note quality paper, control the certificates, present those certificates of the rough diamonds in the United States, and what do you do when you export? You have to file an export license. You have to file an export declaration rather. That export declaration receives from the Census Bureau a number. The Census Bureau was assigning those numbers by hand. I asked them if they could do this electronically, and would it be a unique number? And they made some changes to their system. They were moving electronically. They said they could do that. So each certificate became, as it's used, a unique certificate, validating that information that had been put on the certificate, allowing the law enforcement agencies to know that that document was a singular unique document and validated the process and made it possible for us to achieve our goal. Very insightful, David. - [David Schoenbaum] As they used to say in the Soviet Union, I pretend to work. They pretend to pay me. J.D., there are a number of questions, all of them good, some of them, I think, easier to answer in a sentence or two than others. An obvious one all of us theoretically consumers of diamonds how do we know when we buy a diamond that ours is okay? - [J.D. Bindenagel] The diamond trade has, in the last three years, essentially cleared the market of diamonds that preceded this system. So that from this point forward, from the beginning of the process, from 2003 forward, you can be assured that the diamonds that are newly cut from rough diamonds are clean diamonds. That is a question that you should certainly ask the jewelers because it's only through the awareness of the public to know that this is an important thing that as a consumer nation of diamonds that we continue to ask. That supports the process. It supports the process that it would continue. And the historical side, diamonds are rather long lasting, and there may be some concerns there. However, you can only begin as you go forward, and we've begun in 2003. Ask for clean diamonds. Ask the jewelers who may not know. Clerks may not know. That puts it into the discussion. And they can find an answer, and those diamonds that have been traded since 2003 are clean diamonds. - [David Schoenbaum] A follow up question, as you made clear, the United States did not exactly lead the charge here. Who did? Where did the initiative come from? - [J.D. Bindenagel] The initiative came in the first instance by the NGOs that chose this issue. They decided to do, in good NGO fashion, dramatic efforts to throw fake blood on consumer places, diamond dealers in New York. The industry noted their challenge to this luxury and the image of their product. And then, the United Nations acted first. The United Nations Security Council, recognizing the international implications of this, banned all trade in diamonds from Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola. That's the foundation of the process. Out of that, the United Nations General Assembly encouraged others, that is the diamond industry and the governments to come together to make this a worldwide trade ban. It was, however, out of that first threat to human life in Sierra Leone, Angola, and Liberia that the process really began. Of course, provoked and encouraged by NGOs and the response of the industry. Governments, individual national governments, followed the lead of the South African government, which convened its process in 2000. And governments came slowly to the process at the end, and only with the interaction of the industry and the NGOs was able to muster the decision making capability to have a decision. - [David Schoenbaum] A short question, and I think probably answerable with yes or no. Does this cover industrial diamonds as well as jewelry? - [J.D. Bindenagel] It covers all rough diamonds, yes. - [David Schoenbaum] The diamond trade, in my experience, is certainly among the world's odder with a route that makes some countries more equal than others. In the process of containing and limiting and regulating the trade, have some countries, in fact, been more equal than others? Obvious candidates, places where the process is real in Belgium? - [J.D. Bindenagel] The diamond industry, I've referred to the mining and the rough diamonds, but as David has pointed out, the critical issue is then the cutting of diamonds. The cutting of diamonds has traditionally for several hundred years been located in Antwerp. 85% of the world's diamond trade was done through there. Recently, two other phenomena occurred. In the 70s, the diamond cutting industry in Tel Aviv was created and has grown. And even more interesting, a niche in the diamond market, very small diamonds, which you will find in much jewelry today comes out of Mumbai, out of India. And those cutting centers are critical and were critical for the success of this process. New York and London also played a role. Canada discovered about a decade ago that they actually had diamonds and have become a major contributor to this process. Diamonds are fascinating in that sense, but cutting of the diamonds, and particularly the European Union was a critical factor, South Africa, in the process of controlling the diamonds played a very very important role. - [David Schoenbaum] It was asked. You referred to the recovery of the native patrimony. With what assurance can you tell us? In a part of the world outstanding for it opacities and third, fourth, and fifth parties and their intervention, to what extent can you say with any assurance that the money is reaching the people for whom it's intended? - [J.D. Bindenagel] In the first instance, the countries that were engaged in civil war, the civil wars have ended. The international community has helped, particularly the British in Sierra Leone to re-establish order, and to bring that money back into governments. In other countries, the danger was not in the first instance of war in Canada or Russia, but in the industry itself. So the industry itself by having a regulatory system that protected the value of the product actually allowed those countries to capture the value and to put it to good use as opposed to illicit diamond trade, which would certainly keep it out of the hands of the government and the people. Now, I'm not standing here and telling you that there's no smuggling. I'm not saying there's no illicit trade. But when we changed from somewhere around 15% to 20% assertion there was an illicit trade to 3% or 4%, then we have made a tremendous move toward getting the money back to the people so that the governments are responsible for the most part to the people to get the money to do things for the benefit of the individual countries. - [David Schoenbaum] Question from a movie lover, Laura in the audience, could you repeat the particulars on the diamond film that will soon appear in a theater near us? - [J.D. Bindenagel] Let me make two comments. One, the title, the working title is The Blood Diamond. If you want to Google it, I'm sure you'll find it in Google. It is in production. It is not scheduled to be out for another year. Leonardo DiCaprio is the star. I will give you my personal view is as a former State Department diplomat, I can tell you that in movies, diplomats don't do very well. I'm concerned that this movie will reflect not only the killing and the civil war in Sierra Leone, which it should, but will miss the opportunity to say that the international community came together to talk about what we talked about today. And if I have any help from you all to ensure that the least in the epilogue it says that the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme was established, the killings stopped in those countries, particularly the subject of the movie in Sierra Leone, and that they are able to move on with their lives, I will be very happy. We'll see. - [George Bedell] We have reached the time to conclude today's program. On behalf of the Iowa City Foreign Relations Council, I want to thank J.D. Bindenagel for sharing with us and our radio and cable TV audiences his observation on stopping conflict diamonds. Can the Kimberley Process succeed? I also wish to thank our sponsors, International Programs at the University of Iowa, Mike Margolin, and Hands Jewelers since 1854. If you have questions about joining Iowa City Foreign Relations Council, please call the office, 335-0351. If you enjoy listening to this program on the radio or by cable TV, please consider supporting the council's work by sending a contribution to ICFRC 140 International Center, Iowa City 52242. We are adjourned. Please return your name tags. Thanks.